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bstract: Low electoral turnout has 
led to a vicious circle for which the 
young do not vote and vote-seeking 
politicians ignore their needs. A powerful 
method is needed to address this in both the 
short-term and long-term. I consider two such 
methods: compulsory voting and a scheme 
of financial incentives for young voters. The 
financial incentive scheme that I consider 
would pay young people £30 if they attend an 
hour-long information session on the election, 
an hour-long discussion session, and then vote. 
I argue that my proposed financial incentive 
scheme is preferable to compulsory voting be-
cause it is more likely to lead young people to 
deliver reasoned, quality votes than compulso-
ry voting, and it does not violate individual 
liberty.
Introduction
In many different ways young people to-
day are underrepresented by politics.1 One 
important element of this underrepresenta-
tion, and the element with which this essay 
is concerned, is the low electoral turnout 
among the young. It is important to note 
from the start that there is no simple solu-
tion that could boost youth engagement in 
a single stroke,2 and I aver that many dif-
ferent short-term and long-term strategies 
should be employed to increase electoral 
engagement among the young.3
However, this essay focuses on two con-
trasting strategies: a disincentive scheme for 
non-voters (i.e., compulsory voting), and 
a scheme of financial incentives for which 
young people receive a payment of £30 if 
they attend an hour-long information ses-
sion on the election, an hour-long discus-
sion session, and then vote. I argue that 
respect for liberty4 and an understanding of 
the importance of a reasoned and engaged 
vote imply that, of these two, my proposed 
financial incentive scheme is preferable. It 
will, I contend, improve both the short-
term and long-term political engagement 
of young people and lead to a virtuous 
circle for which they are better politically 
represented and more electorally engaged 
as a result.
The essay begins by analysing the effects 
of electoral turnout among the young in 
terms of vicious and virtuous circles. I then 
consider the merits of compulsory voting 
as a method to boost turnout and argue 
that compulsory voting infringes unac-
ceptably upon our liberty and would not 
deliver reasoned votes. Hence, I introduce 
my proposed scheme of financial incentives 
for young people and argue that it is pref-
erable to compulsory voting in both these 
respects: it violates no one’s liberty and is 
more likely to deliver well-reasoned votes. 
Finally, I reply to some possible objections 
to the implementation of this scheme.
Why should my proposed scheme not be 
extended to all generations? There are four 
reasons. First, the electoral turnout among 
the young is significantly worse than that 
of other age-cohorts, so in the short-term 
there is more of a pressing need to raise elec-
toral turnout among the young than among 
other age groups. Second, I hope that the 
benefits of the scheme, and in particular 
the force of habit, will lead young people to 
continue to vote as they get older, and thus 
in the long-term the benefits of the scheme 
will begin to influence the older generations 
too. Third, the expense of the scheme is sig-
nificantly reduced by virtue of its applying 
only to young people, making it a more 
economically viable option. 
Fourth, if the scheme applied to everyone 
then this would seem to suggest that the 
government always needs to bribe its pop-
ulace to vote: the scheme would no longer 
seem merely like a means by which to boost 
the electoral engagement of the populace 
in response to their current level of engage-
ment, since there would be no time when 
the payment scheme would cease to apply 
to the voter. The message that I intend for 
the government to send out to young peo-
ple is rather: “We want to incentivise you 
to develop a habit of and engagement with 
voting now, so that you are motivated to 
continue voting in the future even when 
this incentive scheme ceases for you.” Now, 
I have no objection to the information and 
discussion sessions themselves (without any 
payment for attendance) being arranged for 
older generations too, if the government 
were happy to fund these. However, that is 
a different proposal and I cannot comment 
on it any further here.
Finally, I should note that in terms of back-
ground statistics and details such as the 
level of payment that I propose for my fi-
nancial incentive scheme, this essay focuses 
 principally on UK politics. However, the 
general arguments that I make are in no 
sense restricted to the UK, and the reason-
ing that I employ to arrive at this payment 
figure, for example, can easily be applied 
mutatis mutandis to other countries that are 
interested in increasing electoral turnout 
among the young.
Young people’s low electoral turnout: 
vicious and virtuous circles
Concerningly, the past decade has wit-
nessed young people becoming increasingly 
disengaged with the political process and 
institutions, especially with formal politics 
such as voting.5 In the 2010 British gener-
al election, the average turnout was 65%; 
of those aged 65 or above, the turnout av-
eraged 76%; but of those aged 18-24, the 
average turnout was just 44%.6 There is a 
similar comparative difference between the 
numbers of young and older people voting 
in America and Indonesia, with the com-
parative difference only slightly better in 
Japan.7
Yet before I continue I should respond to an 
objection that, if true, could invalidate the 
goals of this essay before it has even begun. 
This objection runs as follows: even if many 
young people do not vote at present, as they 
move into their middle age, finding them-
selves more affected by government policies 
and reaching a more mature stage of their 
political life-cycle, they will start to vote in 
greater numbers. It follows, so the objection 
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goes, that there is no need to worry about 
their low turnout now – this is something 
that will naturally be addressed over time. 
There are two reasons why this objection 
is fallacious. First, there is limited empiri-
cal evidence of this ageing effect, whereas 
there is strong evidence to suggest that in 
large part voting is a result of habit that is 
learnt in one’s first few elections.8 Second, 
even if it were the case that people will tend 
to vote in greater numbers as they get older, 
it is still of concern that many young peo-
ple today do not vote, because voting helps 
to close the democratic deficit and ensure 
that representatives are accountable to the 
groups that they represent – self-interested 
vote-seeking politicians will not be motivat-
ed to represent the views of young people if 
the youth vote has only a very minimal im-
pact on the politicians’ election prospects.9 
Empirical analysis of government policies 
in recent years seems to confirm that pol-
iticians are more interested in the needs 
of young people’s parents’ generation than 
those of young people themselves.10 This 
seems to have become something of a vi-
cious circle whereby young people do not 
vote, politicians thus ignore the interests of 
young people, young people feel alienated 
from the political process so choose not to 
vote; and so forth. Young people not par-
ticipating in electoral politics thus becomes 
self-reinforcing.11 
To a large extent, the reasons why young 
people do not vote can be understood as a 
consequence of this vicious circle. For exam-
ple, many young people may not vote due 
to disillusionment (a feeling that the out-
come of an election does not matter); feel-
ing that they lack political efficacy (think-
ing, for example, that an individual vote 
will not make any difference); or believing 
that they do not have enough knowledge 
to vote.12 In a study quoted by Henn and 
Foard, 61% of the young people surveyed 
felt that the influence they had on decisions 
made on their behalf by politicians was lit-
tle or none, and 64% of the young people 
surveyed said that they did not believe they 
had enough knowledge to vote.13 If politi-
cians were to take the needs and interests 
of young people seriously, however, then 
this would start to address and resolve their 
feelings of  disillusionment and lacking po-
litical efficacy. And if young people became 
more engaged in the political process then 
they would naturally develop more political 
knowledge, too. Indeed, if young people are 
encouraged to vote in great enough num-
bers then it is possible that a virtuous circle 
will result: politicians will jump to try to 
win over the now significant “youth vote” 
and so will listen to the views and concerns 
of young people, young people will feel rep-
resented by the political process and so will 
be motivated to vote for the politician who 
best represents their views and concerns, 
politicians will try to represent the needs of 
young people in order to win their vote; and 
so forth.
However, there is little point in young peo-
ple voting unless some degree of conscious 
decision-making underpins their vote. If 
self-interested vote-seeking politicians were 
to think that the votes of young people were 
somewhat random, perhaps because young 
people lacked interest in electoral politics 
and were voting only due to the threat of 
punishment under a system of compulsory 
voting, then they might continue to ignore 
the votes of young people since there would 
be no point in trying to win over the youth 
vote. Hence, the virtuous circle could not 
result. Therefore it is not enough for young 
people only to vote: they must also take the 
time to engage with the election so that 
their vote constitutes a reasoned expression 
of their political will.
Voting or not voting is also influenced by 
habit. A study by Gerber et al. involving 
25,200 voters revealed that if considered in 
isolation the effect of habit, ceteris  paribus, 
meant that a person’s voting in one elec-
tion would substantially increase the like-
lihood that that person would vote in the 
future.14 Abstention, too, was found to be 
habit-forming: a person’s tendency both 
to vote, and to not vote, is not merely the 
function of similar choices being made in 
similar circumstances. Thus, elections that 
do not stimulate high turnout among the 
young cause a “footprint” of low turnout in 
the electorate’s age structure – many people 
who do not utilise their first opportunity 
to vote go on to fail to vote in subsequent 
elections too.15 Hence, if young people are 
persuaded to vote in their first few elections, 
the effect of habit suggests that that age co-
hort will continue to vote in large numbers 
as they get older, too.16
How to increase electoral participation 
among the young
A short-term boost to the electoral turnout 
of young people may be all that is needed 
to start the virtuous circle rolling so that a 
more long-term solution to the low elector-
al turnout among the young also begins to 
emerge. A powerful and immediately im-
pactful scheme is therefore required to en-
courage young people to vote. One obvious 
candidate is a disincentive scheme for not 
voting – this is the method of compulsory 
voting according to which people are legally 
required to vote and a failure to do so will 
(in theory) result in some form of penalty, 
such as a fine. However, while compulso-
ry voting is common and its drawbacks 
and merits have been widely discussed, its 
 opposite, a scheme that encourages people 
to vote by means of financial incentives, 
has received much less academic attention 
(although there do exist other propositions 
of a similar nature, such as Ackerman and 
Fishkin’s proposal of paying people $150 to 
take part in a day of deliberation two weeks 
before election day17). As far as I am aware, 
a scheme that pays people to vote has not 
been practiced anywhere in the world apart 
from Ancient Athens where, in the 4th 
century BCE, payment was introduced in 
order to boost electoral turnout.18 Aristotle 
specifically connected the introduction of 
state payment with the difficulties of attain-
ing a reasonable level of attendance at the 
Assembly.19
I compare compulsory voting with a fi-
nancial incentive scheme as a method to 
encourage young people to vote in part 
to fill this academic gap, but also because 
it appears to offer a particularly powerful 
way to address the low electoral turnout of 
young people; or so I will argue. Further-
more, because compulsory voting is widely 
practiced and is already established as an 
effective means of raising turnout, it would 
undoubtedly be a powerful contender for 
addressing the low electoral turnout among 
the young. I therefore hope that if I can 
show my financial incentive scheme to be 
preferable to compulsory voting as a way 
to boost turnout, then it follows that my 
scheme merits serious consideration. 
Compulsory voting has also been proposed 
as a strategy that could be applied only to 
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first-time voters, with the express intention 
of improving the political representation of 
young people. Birch et al. have proposed 
making voting compulsory for first time 
voters, and fining young people about £12 
if they do not vote in their first election.20 
My arguments against compulsory voting 
are mostly general, but can also be seen as 
challenging specifically this sister proposal.
Compulsory voting – a solution to 
young people’s low electoral turnout?
Compulsory voting is practiced in a num-
ber of countries all over the world includ-
ing Cyprus, Belgium, Turkey, and Austral-
ia. The punishments for non-voters range 
from small fines to disenfranchisement, so-
cial sanctions and possible imprisonment, 
although the most common punishment is 
a small fine. In practice, however, enforce-
ment is universally lax, despite the wide 
range of stated penalties; in Australia, per-
haps 4% of non-voters actually incur a pen-
alty of some type, and in Greece the penalty 
of jail time is apparently never imposed.21 
Various studies have shown that compulsory 
voting is an effective way to raise voter turn-
out: on average it raises voting turnout by 
7-16 percentage points, which is significant 
when we consider that the punishments for 
not voting are very rarely enforced and are 
usually minimal.22 When the Netherlands 
withdrew compulsory voting in 1967, turn-
out dropped by 10%; and it increased by 
15% in Costa Rica when penalties for not 
voting were introduced.23 Furthermore, re-
search suggests that the comparative differ-
ence between the turnout of younger gen-
erations and average turnout may be better 
under compulsory voting than when voting 
is voluntary, because the impact of age on 
turnout is reduced.24
Compulsory voting is also considered bene-
ficial because it reduces the role of money in 
politics since voters do not need to be goad-
ed to the polls; it may become an incentive 
for people to become better informed about 
the political options available to them; it 
forces parties to take seriously the vote of 
the poor, weak and marginalised who oth-
erwise may not have voted; it produces pol-
icies more closely aligned to citizen prefer-
ences when rational citizens may otherwise 
have chosen to abstain; and it enables every 
adult to become an autonomous agent who 
makes as many decisions about their own 
life as any other adult.25
In practice, only the first of these benefits 
holds much weight – it is quite possible that 
the cost of elections for campaigning parties 
would be reduced. However, it is hard to 
imagine that being forced to vote will mo-
tivate citizens to learn about politics; on the 
contrary, it may actually discourage people’s 
interest in political education as they react 
against perceived oppression.26 The Austral-
ian case, where compulsory voting is long 
established and extremely popular, demon-
strates that increasing turnout does not 
force parties to compete for the votes of the 
poor, weak and marginalised since it is clear 
that the parties in Australia focus primarily 
on winning the votes of the middle class.27 
Furthermore, far from supporting our au-
tonomy in a way that legitimately addresses 
the problem of abstention, compulsory vot-
ing infringes unacceptably upon individual 
freedom. The great liberal writer Benjamin 
Constant wrote that “it is everyone’s right 
to exercise some influence on the adminis-
tration of the government, either by elect-
ing all or particular officials, or through rep-
resentations, petitions, demands to which 
the authorities are more or less compelled to 
pay heed”.28 It is therefore crucial to our po-
litical liberty that we have the right to vote. 
However, it does not follow that we have a 
duty to vote.29 And even if we were to have 
a duty to vote, it would not follow that this 
should be enforced by legal compulsion.30 
Furthermore, Mill explained that in order 
to defend our liberty, society should not in-
terfere with someone unless what he is do-
ing will cause harm to others (and, logically, 
that by interfering with him that harm will 
be reduced or prevented).31 Thus, infringing 
upon individual liberty by forcing people to 
vote could be justified only if it were very 
likely to prevent such harm.32 Otherwise, 
forcing someone to vote would constitute 
an unjustifiable violation of what Berlin 
described as our “negative freedom”33 – our 
freedom not to be interfered with. Our lib-
erty, or “negative freedom”, is intuitively 
valuable and so, to be justified, any propos-
al that will infringe upon it must be able to 
prove that it is of significant value.
Now, advocates of compulsory voting 
may take up this challenge, and argue that 
compulsory voting is able to prevent harm 
caused to others because, if no one were 
to vote, this would lead to the collapse of 
democracy. However, as a defence of com-
pulsory voting this seems somewhat im-
plausible: electoral turnout may be low in 
a number of countries, but it is nowhere 
near low enough that enforcing compulso-
ry voting would be required to prevent the 
collapse of democracy. Lijphart also defends 
compulsory voting, which he regards as a 
very small infringement upon our liberty, 
on the basis that many other problems of 
collective action are solved by government 
using obligations: jury service, paying tax-
es, school attendance and so forth – so why 
not voting too, which is far less burdensome 
than these?34 Yet the answer to this objec-
tion is that it is precisely because voting is 
less burdensome than these other actions 
that the majority of people choose to vote 
without it having to be made compulsory. 
If paying taxes were not compulsory, then it 
is probable that very few people would pay 
them, and the country would incur serious 
problems as a result. Yet the same is not the 
case with voting: it is because the “cost” of 
voting is very minimal that many people 
choose to vote – there is no reason that it be 
made compulsory in the way that taxation 
and jury service are. Furthermore, it is be-
cause voting is not very burdensome that I 
believe my financial incentive scheme will be 
able to act as an effective incentive for people 
to vote despite the cost of voting.
The advocate of compulsory voting might 
object that I am responding here to a very 
thin concept of democracy that misses what 
is really at stake: perhaps it is true that 
absent a legal compulsion to vote there is 
minimal danger of an actual collapse of 
democracy, but there are nonetheless signif-
icant harms that a democratic society will 
incur as a result of individuals choosing not 
to vote. I have already argued that by virtue 
of the vicious circle the low electoral turn-
out on the part of a particular age cohort 
leads to political neglect; but if this is true, 
why should the importance of avoiding this 
vicious circle not trump an individual’s neg-
ative liberty not to be interfered with?
If the question were that clear cut (helping 
the individual and society versus protecting 
the individual’s negative liberty), then this 
“Research suggests that turnout of 
younger generations may be com-
paratively better under compulsory 
voting than when voting is voluntary, 
since the impact of age on turnout is 
reduced.”
“It is clear that to some extent many 
young people choosing not to vote 
will harm others because it will lead 
self-interested politicians to neglect 
the needs and interests of young 
people.”
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objection would undoubtedly have serious 
weight, for I do not pretend to defend an 
inviolable concern for liberty. However, the 
true picture is somewhat more nuanced. 
The virtuous circle of voting assumes that 
the voter casts a vote which represents a 
reasoned expression of her political will; 
otherwise, as argued above, politicians will 
still not be motivated to consider the inter-
ests of young people in an attempt to win 
over the “youth vote”. But the young people 
who vote only because it is compulsory (the 
group with whom we are primarily con-
cerned here) will not vote in a way that gives 
a reasoned expression of their political will 
since it is not a reasoned view, but rather the 
threat of legal action, that motivates them 
to vote. Under compulsory voting, poli-
ticians will therefore be aware that young 
people are not delivering reasoned votes and 
so the virtuous circle will not result. The 
response that where compulsory voting is 
practiced there tend to be few blank votes, 
demonstrating that people are not unmoti-
vated to deliver quality votes under a system 
compulsory voting,35 misses the point: the 
fact that someone casts an actual, and not 
a blank, vote does not suffice to show that 
they have put any thought into it. Hence, 
neither the individual nor the society will 
benefit from infringing upon the individu-
al’s liberty and legally requiring him to vote. 
Given that this is the case, the individual’s 
negative liberty not to be interfered with 
holds greater weight than a concern for the 
welfare of the individual and society.
Moreover, as John Rawls argued in his The-
ory of Justice, if a citizen is to vote then it 
is necessary for that citizen to first develop 
a willingness and aptitude for forming po-
litical opinions that will appeal to others, 
what he calls “education to public spirit”, 
before she can then “acquire an affirmative 
sense of political duty and obligation, that 
is, one that goes beyond the mere willing-
ness to submit to law and government”.36 
Thus, affirmative political obligations can-
not suffice as a justification for compulsory 
voting.37 Rather, a sense of political duty 
arises in part from the way in which elec-
tions require citizens to develop political 
opinions that accord with public spirit – it 
cannot just be imposed upon citizens who 
are unwilling to engage in this process, and 
the legal enforcement of such an imposition 
is surely unjustifiable.
One final defence of compulsory voting is 
that the ability to cast a blank vote – or in-
deed to be able to choose an option that de-
notes one’s dissatisfaction with the political 
system or its available options, which seems 
to me a sensible way to allow voters who 
are dissatisfied with their political options 
to express this opinion – implies that com-
pulsory voting does not violate autonomy 
in a strong paternalistic way.38 Individuals 
are not being made to act in a way that will 
“protect” them, or “benefit” them from an 
informed choice of action. In fact, com-
pulsory voting, according to Lacroix, does 
not even impose a “very minor restriction” 
on individual freedom,39 (contrary to what 
 Lijphart argued40). Rather, it is actually le-
gitimated by autonomy and equal liberty – 
the very principles of political liberalism.41
That is a misleading diagnosis. Compulso-
ry voting violates our negative freedom not 
to be interfered with – the only question is 
whether this violation can be justified by 
the benefit that results from legally compel-
ling people to vote, a position that I have 
argued against. In response to my worry 
about the quality of votes that compulsory 
voting will deliver, the advocate of compul-
sory voting could claim that under compul-
sory voting, people are required to develop 
well-informed political opinions; but this 
response, as well as being practically quite 
vacuous (how could this requirement be 
enforced?) this seems incompatible with the 
liberal perspective of respect for all attitudes 
in the world – attitudes that may value, per-
haps, spontaneity, spiritual quest, or even 
a scepticism towards organised activity, all 
of which could lead someone to choose not 
to vote.42 Clearly, I am not arguing that the 
choice not to vote should be encouraged. 
But a liberal respect for different opinions 
surely implies that people should be free to 
think in ways that may lead them not to 
want to vote, or indeed to want not to vote. 
Furthermore, the argument that the ability 
to cast a blank vote means that compulsory 
voting does not violate our autonomy is like 
saying that being forced to attend church 
but not to pray would not violate our con-
science, which is clearly absurd.43 
Lacroix’s argument amounts to the propo-
sition that forcing someone to turn up to 
a polling booth is an acceptable infringe-
ment upon someone’s liberty, but requiring 
them to vote once there is not. In saying 
this, Lacroix is prioritising the voter’s “free-
dom of thought”, and saying that as long 
as this particular freedom is not violated 
(which it is not, since the voter may choose 
not to vote), the voter’s “liberal rights” are 
not breached. But the voter’s liberal rights 
extend beyond merely her freedom of 
thought, and her freedom of movement (or 
of non-movement, i.e. her freedom to stay 
at home that day) is a case in point. Thus, 
Lacroix’s argument implies that the value of 
the vote in supporting the principle of equal 
liberty44 outweighs someone’s freedom (of 
(non-)movement) to stay at home, but 
does not outweigh that person’s freedom (of 
thought) not to vote.
However, this argument assumes that le-
gally compelling people to vote will bring 
about valuable electoral outcomes that 
support principle of equal liberty but, as I 
argued above, it is not at all clear that such 
benefits of voting will accrue under a system 
of compulsory voting. Some people might 
not be interested or motivated to vote, but 
after having been forced to the polls, they 
may decide that they “might as well vote 
now”, and even though they will not cast 
a blank vote they nonetheless have no actu-
al interest in voting and their vote will not 
constitute a reasoned expression of their po-
litical will. Thus, their vote will be of little 
or no value, and it will surely be of less val-
ue than the vote of someone who has freely 
chosen to turn up to vote, as I argue below. 
Therefore, since it seems unlikely that the 
benefits of voting will hold for those who 
vote only as a consequence of compulsory 
voting, a concern for people’s liberty (in 
this case the freedom of (non-)movement, 
and not of thought) trumps compulsory 
voting’s vacuous attempt to further “liberal 
equality” by forcing people to vote; the abil-
ity to cast a blank vote merely reduces, but 
certainly does not eliminate, the extent to 
which individual liberty is violated.
In sum, the violation of liberty that occurs 
under compulsory voting is motivated by a 
dubious attempt to bring about the benefits 
of voting – and I have argued that a concern 
for liberty outweighs these benefits because 
it seems unlikely that valuable, reasoned 
votes will be cast by the people who vote 
only because voting is compulsory (the very 
people whom the practice of compulsory 
voting primarily seeks to affect), and so the 
virtuous circle of voting will not hold. How-
ever, even if the reader objects to this claim, 
for my central thesis to go through all that 
I need to establish is the weaker claim that 
the benefits of voting are more likely to ac-
“Compulsory voting violates our 
negative freedom not to be interfered 
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crue under my proposed  incentive scheme 
than under compulsory voting. Ultimately, 
I am arguing that my proposed incentive 
scheme offers a better way to improve elec-
toral turnout among the young than com-
pulsory voting, and this argument does not 
hinge upon whether compulsory voting is 
unjustifiable (though my arguments tend to 
point in this direction). 
Encouraging young people to vote by 
financial inducement
I have argued that boosting electoral  turnout 
by means of legal compulsion, which func-
tions by giving people a disincentive for not 
voting, constitutes an unjustifiable viola-
tion of individual liberty. The contrasting 
alternative approach to boosting electoral 
turnout among the young that I consider 
now is an incentive system for young voters. 
I argue for an incentive scheme that will pay 
young people between the ages of 18 and 
28 a small amount, I suggest £30, if they 
attend an hour’s information session on the 
election, partake in an hour’s discussion 
session on the election, both of which are 
arranged by an independent body without 
any political affiliations, and then cast their 
vote.
To be confident of the appropriate level 
of payment for this scheme, empirical re-
search could be carried out into the min-
imum payment sufficient to act as an ef-
fective incentive for young voters, making 
a trade-off between maximising the chance 
of incentivizing young people to vote while 
minimizing expense. However, I suggest 
£30 because it is significantly more than 
the equivalent minimum wage payment for 
doing three hours of work (approximating 
the voting process to take about an hour), 
and therefore it would presumably make 
for an effective incentive for young people 
to vote. If it were much less than this then, 
especially if we also consider the time and 
expense that young people will require for 
getting to the sessions and to the election, it 
would surely fail to incentivise those young 
people who would prefer to spend this time 
engaged in leisure activities, or working in 
their normal job. But the payment is less 
than double the equivalent minimum wage 
payment for three hours of work, so it would 
not constitute a huge expense. If  anything, 
my  suspicion is that to be an effective incen-
tive for most young people (and, crucially, 
not just the young people who are already 
electorally motivated) to attend the sessions 
and vote, the payment would have to be 
at least £30; research might reveal that it 
would have to be more, perhaps £40. How-
ever, since £30 is significantly more than 
the equivalent minimum-wage payment 
for three hours of work, I assume for the 
remainder of this essay that it is enough to 
act as an effective incentive for the young 
people.
Of course, it is possible that the informa-
tion and discussion sessions which I pro-
pose could be made a compulsory part of 
a scheme of compulsory voting in order 
to make it more likely that citizens cast a 
well-reasoned vote. But even if this hap-
pened, as well as constituting a larger vio-
lation of individual liberty (since now the 
person is forced not just to vote, but also to 
attend these two sessions), I do not believe 
that these sessions would lead to as much 
benefit as they would under my incentive 
scheme. People tend to be more interested 
in what they choose for themselves than 
what they are forced to do under threat 
of legal compulsion. Someone who freely 
chooses to work for the military, for exam-
ple, is much more likely to be interested 
and engaged in his job than someone who 
does so only as a consequence of conscrip-
tion. Therefore, even though I hope that the 
sessions will increase the attendees’ political 
knowledge and engagement, it is likely to 
do so more effectively when the attendees 
are present at the sessions as a result of free 
choice than when they attend merely as a 
result of legal compulsion. 
It could also be suggested that under com-
pulsory voting these information and discus-
sion sessions could nonetheless be offered 
without attendance being financially incen-
tivised or legally enforced. Now, regardless 
of whether or not compulsory voting is in 
place, I agree that these sessions would be of 
value. However, by attracting people to the 
sessions who would not otherwise come, and 
incentivizing people to engage with the ses-
sions by making payment conditional upon 
such engagement as my scheme proposes, 
the sessions are likely to be of more bene-
fit under my scheme of financial incentives 
than under any other scheme.
It is perfectly possible that there will also be 
other relevant electoral events happening 
between elections, such as referenda, beg-
ging the question of whether my scheme 
should, if applied to everyone aged 18-28, 
be extended to these events as well. Since, 
in the UK at least, such events are still quite 
rare, my answer would be yes: the total 
expense of my financial incentive scheme 
when it is extended to these events would 
still constitute a tiny fraction of govern-
ment expenditure. For the expense to even 
amount to just 0.5% of government ex-
penditure, there would have to be about 70 
such events between every election45 – this 
would still be a small expense even though 
the regularity of these events would be far 
more than the current frequency of elector-
al events in the UK.
Therefore, it seems entirely justifiable that 
for the near future this scheme should apply 
to all electoral events aside from the party 
elections – the expense will continue to be 
minimal. Only if referenda started to oc-
cur much more frequently than they do at 
present could the resultant level of expendi-
ture justify the government’s being selective 
about the events for which it offers financial 
inducement for the young people’s attend-
ance. However, even if, for whatever reason, 
policymakers were reluctant to extend the 
financial incentive scheme to other electoral 
events, and happy only to apply the scheme 
to the main election every four or five years, 
this would be of significant benefit; and it 
is very possible that the increased electoral 
engagement and force of habit that results 
from the scheme being applied with regards 
to young people voting in the party elec-
tions would spillover to their engagement 
in other electoral events anyway, even if the 
scheme did not also apply to these other 
electoral events.
Some objections
Now, it could be objected that those who 
attend the sessions under my incentive 
scheme do not make an entirely “free 
choice” to do so, since many will be there 
only because of the financial incentive. 
However, although that is to some extent 
true, the attendees are nonetheless likely to 
have more interest in the sessions under my 
scheme than under compulsory voting, for 
two reasons. First, although they may be 
primarily financially motivated, those who 
attend the sessions are nonetheless making 
a conscious choice to spend their time and 
make their money in this way, rather than 
by doing anything else. Thus, their choice 
implies that they are at least relatively hap-
“The contrasting alternative approach 
to boosting electoral turnout among 
the young […] [is] an incentive scheme 
that will pay young people between 
the ages of 18 and 28 a small amount, 
I suggest £30 […].”
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py to attend the sessions, having weighed 
up the value of their attendance against the 
value of doing otherwise – I am sure that far 
fewer people would turn up if similar levels 
of payment were offered to those prepared 
to clean the town’s sewerage system, for ex-
ample.46 This would not be implied if the 
sessions were an obligatory part of a system 
of compulsory voting because attendees 
would have no choice as to whether they 
should attend the sessions.
Second, the payment, as I explain below, is 
conditional upon the young people demon-
strating their engagement with the issues 
under discussion, thus motivating them to 
listen to and engage with the sessions. This 
extra motivation to engage that someone 
will experience once they are at the session 
could not apply without such an incentive 
scheme (unless, of course, the disturbing 
option of fining people who were not en-
gaged in the sessions were to be used – but 
surely no one would accept the level of 
 liberty-violation implied by this).
The benefits of such a scheme are plain. 
Providing the selective benefit of financial 
payment to voters is much more pleasing 
than fining non-voters, and this would be 
especially true for young people who want 
and need money, but this scheme also of-
fers a powerful method by which to over-
come abstention and reduce the democratic 
deficit, bringing government policies into 
closer alignment with citizen preferenc-
es.47 It could accomplish the same function 
as compulsory voting without infringing 
upon individual freedom.48
Why would it offer such a powerful incen-
tive for young people to vote? Very simply: 
because young people want, and need, 
money. Of course, this is true of every-
one, and so if it were applied to all eligible 
voters then it would offer an effective in-
centive scheme for them too. But, plainly, 
young people tend to have and to earn less 
than older people. Also, for young people 
earning money may still have some novelty 
factor that has long since disappeared for 
the older generations. Furthermore, while 
the young people who work will tend to 
earn less than older generations, there are 
also many young people who are unable 
to sustain a regular job because they are 
in full-time education or because they are 
suffering from the high level of youth un-
employment. Therefore for both employed 
and unemployed young people even more 
than for the general voting population, the 
opportunity to earn a relatively significant 
sum of money quickly, and with relatively 
little effort, will surely be an enticing pros-
pect and will offer a powerful incentive for 
attending these sessions and voting.
The most common objection to such a sys-
tem is that it will incur the cost of incentiv-
izing people to vote who would have voted 
anyway, a deadweight loss. Conversely, so 
the argument goes, “Fines for abstention 
would circumvent this problem and pro-
duce the same result – high turnout – more 
efficiently”, because fines would only apply 
to those who would not vote; rewarding 
people when turnout is already high will, 
for the most part, simply give rise to an un-
necessary expense.49 
Even though this is a legitimate objection to a 
scheme that pays all citizens to vote, its weight 
is minimal in the case of the scheme that I 
propose because, for this scheme, the expense 
of paying people to vote is limited to young 
people between the ages of 18 and 28, and 
will only arise once every few years when there 
is a general election. By limiting the scope of 
payment to people aged 18-28, the cost of this 
scheme is significantly reduced – at £30 per 
voter, with this expense arising once every five 
years, the cost of such a scheme would make 
up approximately 0.007% of British govern-
ment expenditure over those five years,50 a 
negligible price to pay for improving the elec-
toral turnout of young people and reducing 
the democratic deficit.
Of course, arranging the information and dis-
cussion sessions might also constitute a signif-
icant expense – I make no attempt to estimate 
how much that could be. However, when we 
remember that elections occur just once every 
four or five years, and if we bear in mind the 
value of these sessions as a means by which to 
engage the political will of young people, and 
enable them to activate their virtuous circle 
of voting – hence improving democracy and 
reducing intergenerational injustice – such an 
expense seems entirely worthwhile. Further-
more, it might be possible that this expense 
could be avoided, or at least significantly 
reduced, by finding volunteers to run these 
sessions or requiring local authorities (run by 
people who would not expect to have their in-
comes “topped-up” upon helping with such a 
scheme) to hold them.
Effects of implementing incentives
The reason that I propose payment for 
people between the ages of 18 and 28 (i.e., 
anyone below the age of 29 who is eligi-
ble to vote) is that with elections occur-
ring once every four to five years, such a 
scheme guarantees that young people will 
be paid to vote in at least two elections. I 
hope that this will be sufficient to generate 
in young people the habit of voting, thus 
ensuring that they will continue to vote 
from the age of 29 onwards even after this 
incentive system ceases for them. The study 
cited above noted the significant effect on 
habit of voting in just one election, so vot-
ing in two (or three) elections will logically 
make this habit even stronger. Also, this age 
group makes up quite a significant portion 
of the population – it is, I hope, big enough 
to affect politicians’ electoral prospects and 
so will be sufficient to begin to activate the 
virtuous circle of young people’s political 
representation.
However, I should note that if the govern-
ment were particularly concerned about the 
cost of the scheme, or if it seemed as though 
being paid to vote in two or three elections 
would make the young person more like-
ly to develop a habit of voting only when 
paid, rather than developing a general vot-
ing habit (an objection that I respond to 
below), then my scheme could perhaps be 
modified so as to apply only to first-time 
voters. Even though I argue in this essay 
for the scheme to apply to all those aged 
18-28, it would certainly be preferable for 
the scheme to apply only to first-time voters 
than not to apply at all; and most of the ar-
guments that I make for the scheme would 
apply equally to this alternative.
How exactly the information and discus-
sion sessions should be arranged, the size 
of the group that should attend, and pre-
cisely what the sessions should consist of 
are questions that I make no attempt to ad-
dress here. The basic principles that I would 
suggest for the sessions are very straight-
forward, however: the sessions should be 
arranged by an independent body with no 
political affiliations; the information session 
should be made simple and balanced, yet as 
informative and interesting as possible, of-
fering a summary of what each party offers 
“It is very possible that the […] force 
of habit that results from the scheme 
being applied with regards to young 
people voting in the party elections 
would spillover to their engagement 
in other electoral events.”
“The opportunity to earn a relatively 
significant sum of money quickly, and 
with relatively little effort, will surely 
be an enticing prospect and will offer 
a powerful incentive for […] voting.”
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but with an emphasis on how their policies 
differ, particularly with respect to what they 
offer young people; and the discussion ses-
sion must be made simple and yet as en-
gaging as possible, involving questions that 
unambiguously test the extent to which the 
individuals are engaged with the political 
issues at stake. It would probably be logi-
cal for the hour-long information session 
to be followed immediately by the hour-
long discussion session so that the young 
people still have the information fresh in 
their minds for the discussion session, and 
so that traveling to and from the sessions is 
reduced.
Hasen argues in favour of compulsory vot-
ing over financial inducement as a method 
for raising electoral turnout because, so he 
suggests, a law implies moral authority or 
social consensus, as opposed to his analo-
gous equivalent to financial incentives of 
half a dozen Yum-Yum doughnuts which 
“inspires an outcome-orientated calculus”, 
i.e. an election in which people vote be-
cause of the reward and not because they 
are actually electorally engaged.51 It might, 
Hasen could continue, make people even 
less likely to vote after the rewards cease, 
because the voter will never have developed 
an attitude of engagement but rather will 
have voted only due to the financial incen-
tive on offer. This is similar to the objection 
that paying people to vote might increase 
votes but these votes will not be of value 
because young people will vote only in or-
der to receive money – they will not actually 
be electorally engaged and will not take the 
time to think seriously about whom to vote 
for. Indeed, it seems conceivable that young 
people, often having mastered in school the 
art of pretending to be engaged when really 
they are not, may not actually be engaged 
by the information and discussion sessions 
at all. They may, the objection might run, 
be entirely uninterested in the election and 
turn up only in order to receive payment. 
After two (or three) elections when this pay-
ment ceases for the young person, she may 
be even less inclined to vote than she was 
initially because now she expects to receive 
financial payment in return for voting and 
without this financial inducement she is 
unmotivated to engage in the election. Per-
haps, it might be said, the “habit” of voting 
that the young people develop would sim-
ply be a habit of voting only when there is 
payment on offer.
Yet preventing this apathetical response 
to the sessions is precisely the task of the 
 discussion session: the young people must 
be asked questions which reveal wheth-
er they have indeed listened to what was 
presented in the information session, and 
they must be asked to respond to what 
they heard, and to each other’s responses to 
what was heard, in order to earn the £30. 
 Whether they qualify as having been ac-
tively involved should be at the discretion 
of those running the sessions. The expecta-
tion of engagement should not be especially 
high, of course – I do not suggest this in 
order to reduce the number of people who 
qualify for payment. Rather, I suggest this 
simply to ensure that young people do not 
think that they can turn up and attempt 
to disrupt the sessions, or make no effort 
to engage with the discussion, and still get 
paid. As long as the young person has clear-
ly tried his or her best to follow the infor-
mation presented and to reflect on it, and 
on the opinions of others, that should be 
sufficient for payment.
This then takes the bite out of the above 
objection, because even though it is plau-
sible that a young person who sat in silence 
could pretend to be interested when really 
he is not, if engagement is judged by his 
verbal responses to particular questions and 
to others then he could not pretend to be 
engaged when really he is not – holding a 
face that looks half-interested when really 
we feel bored is one thing, but responding 
to questions about what is being discussed 
when we have not been listening to or 
thinking about what is being said is quite 
another.
Moreover, by virtue of the information and 
discussion sessions, the political engage-
ment of the young people who attended 
the sessions will have increased, and they 
will have developed a taste for what Rik-
er and Ordeshook describe as the psychic 
satisfaction that comes from voting.52 This 
is significant: a citizen participation survey 
by Schlozman et al. revealed that it was 
the feeling of civic gratification (i.e., feel-
ing good about doing one’s duty for society 
or helping the community, a feeling close-
ly related to the “psychic satisfaction” that 
Riker and Ordeshook discuss) that voters 
most  commonly gained from voting (given 
in 93% of cases), above other gratifications 
such as social benefits or policy gratifica-
tion.53 Furthermore, political interest and 
civic skills will both be enhanced by the 
information and discussion sessions, and 
the study of Brady et al. indicates that these 
are the key drivers behind people voting.54 
These sessions will also make the young 
people more likely to continue to partic-
ipate in the political process because they 
also offer a form of civic education, albeit a 
minimal one, that will enhance the political 
knowledge of young people.55 
Furthermore, because the young people 
never expected the payment to continue 
beyond their first two or three elections, it 
seems implausible that their habit of voting 
will have been skewed into a habit of voting 
only when payment is on offer. Imagine a 
child whose mother says to him “I’m go-
ing to give you some extra pocket money 
if you go to the homework club on Friday 
after school, but I’m only going to do this 
for two weeks because I can’t afford more 
than that.” Knowing that the payment will 
soon stop but that the sessions are valuable 
for him, he is likely to develop the habit of 
attending the sessions for their own sake 
rather than for the sake of the pocket mon-
ey (even if they seem slightly less fun than 
going straight home) because he knows that 
the extra pocket money is only a temporary 
bonus. However, if his mother had instead 
said “I will give you extra pocket money 
every week that you go to the homework 
club,” then it seems plausible that, if this pay-
ment were suddenly to stop, the child might 
also stop attending the sessions, having got 
used to the idea that attending the sessions 
was his way of getting more money. In the 
same way, if the young people know from 
the start that the payment will be given only 
for their first two or three elections, and they 
find the sessions interesting and engaging, 
then they are more likely to develop a habit 
of attendance than a habit of attending in the 
expectation of getting paid.
In sum, the young people’s increased elec-
toral interest, civil skills and political en-
gagement, the psychic satisfaction and civic 
gratification that they obtain from voting, 
and the habit that they develop of voting 
(not merely of getting paid), having known 
all along that the payment would cease for 
them once they reached the age of 29, all 
make it likely that the young people will 
continue to vote after the payment stops for 
them.
“It seems conceivable that young 
people, often having mastered in 
school the art of pretending to be 
engaged when really they are not, 
may not actually be engaged by the 
information and discussion sessions 
at all.”
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A further objection might be that encour-
aging young people to vote by financial 
inducement is effectively a bribe: it im-
plies the wrong attitude on the part of the 
government. My answer to this objection 
is that while more young people voting of 
their own volition would undoubtedly be 
a preferable solution, we need to be realis-
tic about our situation. Indeed, empirical 
tests that reveal the influence of financial 
incentives on voters suggest that we should 
reconsider our normative bias against an 
incentive system, realizing that the result 
will be a more politically engaged and dem-
ocratically representative government.56 
Perhaps there might come a time in the 
future when the political representation of 
the youth has improved as a result of the 
virtuous circle, and the democratic deficit 
reduced, to the extent that this scheme is 
no longer required in order to boost elec-
toral turnout among the young. Be that as 
it may, in the present political environment 
with its worryingly low levels of electoral 
engagement among young people, there is 
no doubt that such a scheme would be of 
immense short-term and long-term value 
for improving the electoral turnout of the 
young and consequently improving their 
political representation, thereby also im-
proving the quality of democracy and inter-
generational justice.
Indeed, I suggest that this scheme, in the 
same spirit as quotas, should ultimately in-
tend to „make itself redundant“. For in ad-
dition to boosting young people’s electoral 
turnout in the short-term, it also aims to 
tackle the root causes of young people’s low 
electoral engagement. It will probably have 
spillover effects that improve the political 
representation of young people in other 
ways, too, although I do not have space to 
defend this further claim here. Further-
more, if my analysis so far has been sound, 
this scheme would be more likely than com-
pulsory voting to bring about the benefits 
of voting. Therefore, if compulsory voting is 
taken to be a powerful possible method for 
boosting young people’s electoral turnout 
and producing the benefits of voting then 
it follows that my proposed scheme offers 
an especially compelling method by which 
to achieve this.
Conclusion
Thus, encouraging young people to vote 
by financial inducement offers a powerful 
way to boost electoral turnout among the 
young without infringing upon their lib-
erty, as compulsory voting would do. It 
would, I have argued, also be more like-
ly to deliver reasoned, quality votes than 
compulsory voting. Given that it applies 
only to young people aged 18-28 at the 
time of the election, the expense of such a 
scheme will be negligible. The expense of 
arranging information and discussion ses-
sions for young people might also require 
considerable cost, but this seems entirely 
worthwhile considering the effects it will 
have of boosting the political engagement 
levels of young people and reducing the 
democratic deficit. Furthermore, it might 
be possible to avoid this cost by finding vol-
unteers who can run the sessions. By virtue 
of the virtuous circle, the information and 
discussion sessions, and the force of habit, 
as well as offering a short-term solution to 
the low level of young people’s political en-
gagement, my proposed scheme also offers 
a longer-term solution: politicians will start 
to heed the views and needs of young peo-
ple as they begin to vote in greater numbers, 
thus motivating the young to be more elec-
torally engaged; young people’s interest in, 
and engagement with, politics will increase; 
and the force of habit will therefore make it 
likely that the young people will then con-
tinue to vote as they get older, even after 
this payment ceases for them. Encouraging 
young people by financial inducement, in 
accordance with the scheme that I outlined, 
should therefore be seriously considered by 
academics and policymakers as a radical 
but effective method by which to address 
the current worryingly low level of electoral 
engagement among young people.
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population of people aged 18-28 in Britain 
can be roughly approximated at 9 million. 
If all these young people were to accept 
the incentive scheme, this would therefore 
cost the government about £270 million. 
Figures from 2014 give the government 
expenditure at £732 billion for that year 
(Inman/Arnett 2014). Based on these ap-
proximate figures, to arrive at the number 
of electoral events that could be funded by 
0.5% of expenditure over five years, I divide 
0.5% of government spending over five 
years (i.e., £732 billion x 5 x 0.5% = £18.3 
billion) by the cost of the scheme, assum-
ing that all young people use it (i.e., £270 
million). The final calculation is therefore 
18.3 billion divided by 270 million, which 
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cost of the scheme would constitute approx-
imately 0.037% of government expenditure 
over one year: this is equivalent to roughly 
a 27th of a percentile, or one 2,700th of 
the expenditure. Hence, since elections oc-
cur only once every four or five years, over 
the course of an electoral term this expense 
would be much less again – it would con-
stitute, over a five year term, approximately 
0.007% of government spending.
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emocracy, it seems, is stuck in 
a crisis of self-discovery. Or at 
any rate, one might be forgiv-
en for thinking so when taking a look at 
current turnout statistics. The problem 
of increasing numbers of voting absten-
tions is no longer only a concern for so-
cial scientists, since today the media and 
politicians are also preoccupied with what 
seems to be an inexorable decline in the 
casting of votes. Democratic processes still 
abound, of course, yet many assert that 
they are undermined beyond recognition. 
Despite there being no one-and-only defi-
nition of democracy, but rather a wealth of 
theoretical models each at odds with one 
another, they all embrace the same cen-
tral promise: that of political equality. It is 
this very promise to which Armin Schäfer, 
a researcher at the Max Planck Institute 
for the Study of Societies, has dedicat-
ed his 2015 book Der Verlust politischer 
Gleichheit (in German). By establishing a 
 relationship between liberalisation on the 
one hand, and political inequality, poverty 
of resources and political commitment on 
the other hand, Schäfer seeks to find an 
answer to the question of whether democ-
racy is actually suffering from a declining 
voter turnout and, if so, how a declining 
voter turnout is distributed among the dif-
ferent strata of society. 
“The Bourgeois has his place in modern 
After Equality: Why a Decreasing Turnout Harms Democracy
(Armin Schäfer: Der Verlust politischer Gleichheit)
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